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WILLIAM HowARD TAFr, CHIEF JusTICE. By Alpheus Thomas
Mason. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1964-65. Pp: 354. $6.50.

Chief Justice Taft was a one-man version of what a later vocabulary has come to call a multi-purpose project. He ran the Supreme
Court, influenced the appointment of some of his colleagues.1
directly helped choose a number of district and circuit judges, and
almost single-handedly devised judicial reforms and rammed them ·
through an often hostile Congress. He spent his spare time advising
presidents on fiscal policy and in minding the general public business.
At one point, when Taft was busying himself over where an
American Bar Association committee should erect a statue showing
Blackstone in an English law court, Elihu Root indignantly told
him to give that chore to his secretary and to restrict himself to
matters of importance. But former Philippine Commissioner, former
Secretary of War, former President, former Professor Taft had an
interest reaching anything of concern to the law and his country,
and it never abated. In 1922, the President and the Secretary of
1, See Murphy, In Bis Own Image-Mr. Justice Taft and supreme Court Appoint•
ments, in 1961 SUP. Cr. REY. 159, 162.
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State heard from the Chief Justice of a new plan of the American
Ambassador to England on financing war debts before the Ambassador directly communicated it to them.2 During the Coolidge administration, the Chief had his nose and his pen into bonus legislation, post office pay, and farm relief. 3 Obviously, this many-careered
man needs appraisal from more standpoints than one.

I.

JUDICIAL WORK.

Taft believed that the importance of the Supreme Court lay in
achieving uniformity of law among the federal courts and in expounding the Constitution; anything else was a drag. As he repeatedly said, so far as deciding cases was concerned, one trial and
one appeal should be enough for any litigant.
Taking Taft at his own estimate of the important, his inheritance
is trifling for purposes of the ordinary constitutional life of the
1960's. He built with great and seemingly solid bricks to bulwark
the dominating conservatism of the 1920's; no structure ever had so
aggressive a watchman. However, the flood came and the whole
system is gone; the era of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover is constitutionally extinct.
The 1920's were the apogee of the due process clause as a negative
instrument of government. Within its compendious borders, Justices found the means for striking down wage and hour legislation,
controls on judicial interference with strikes, and a wide variety of
business regulations. In this respect, his views were not quite so
extreme as those of his more conservative brethren. Adkins v. Children's Hospital4 illustrates limits to which he would not go; when
the change came, it washed beyond the boundaries of his dissent.
In other, unrelated areas, the landmarks he meant to leave for the
ages have not stood even this short test of time. 5 This is not to
say that there is not an important residue of Taft in contemporary
law. Stafford v. Wallace, 6 on the commerce clause, for example,
is part of that residue, giving an interpretation subsequently used
at least as a step toward broader doctrines. There is not enough in
all of this, however, to make Taft a major contributor to American
constitutional development.
2. P. 284.
3. Pp. 146-47.
4. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
5. Taft's major work on the presidential removal power, Meyers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926), was largely shorn away by Humphreys v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), on wiretapping, was undermined
by Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
6. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).

Recent Books

December 1965]

II.

365

PROCEDURAL REFORM

The track of the Taft substantive jurisprudence is a path to
nowhere, but the trail of Taft as a procedural reformer leads to
today and to tomorrow as well, since we have not yet fully capitalized
on all his visions. Mason, very wisely realizing this, gives more attention to Taft's accomplishments in procedure and administration than
to his temporary achievements of substantive doctrine.
It is commonly said that the late Judge Charles E. Clark was
the father of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If so, Taft was
their grandfather because he, more than any other person, was their
originator. Unlike his predecessors, Mr. Chief Justice Taft perceived that his office could and should be used to achieve the legislation needed for judicial reform. More than any of his predecessors,
he saw the need to give the Court "legislative" power in the form
of rule-making authority, in order for if to deal with cases by the
thousands with a single rule rather than by one-at-a-time decisions.
This was no late realization; Taft pressed for the revisions which
led to the equity rules of 1912 when he was not in judicial work at
all. Mason documents Taft's activity back to 1884, and presents an
address in 1908 which outlined a program to revise both federal and
state procedural codes which the bar still aspires to complete.7 As
Chief Justice he originated the legislation which authorized the
rule-making process, and dominated the choice of William D.
Mitchell as President Hoover's Attorney General, working closely
with Mitchell thereafter. While the necessary legislation did not
pass until after Taft's death, Mitchell eventually became chairman
of the committee from which the original civil rules came.
Taft was the first national leader to advocate the creation of a
unified procedure for law, equity, and admiralty. It is nothing short
of a miracle of the :flexibility of the human mind that one person
could have been as conservative as Taft in general outlook and yet
as radical in procedural conceptions. This paradox fascinates Mason,
who tries to explain it, but even a great political scientist is no
psychoanalyst. We are necessarily left to marvel at the phenomenon
which may make persons who are generally conservative in substantive areas advocates of procedural change, and which sometimes
makes substantive liberals into procedural conservatives. Mr. Justice
Black in our own day illustrates the latter half of this switch; in this
he follows in the footsteps of Senators Walsh of Montana and Norris
of Nebraska, Taft's opponents of the 1920's.
While the procedural union of law and equity was achieved by
the civil rules of 1937, the unification with admiralty advocated by
7. Pp. 52-53.
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Taft will not come to pass until 1966. It has taken the valiant efforts
of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Judges Albert Maris and Walter Pope,
Professor Brainerd Currie, and many others finally to achieve what
Taft advocated before a congressional committee in 1921.8
Taft's greatest legislative accomplishment was the Certiorari Act
of 1925.9 Every close student of the Supreme Court since at least·
1840 has known that the United States has outgrown the original
court structure established by the Judiciary Act of 1789. The endless expanse of n;iiles, people, and cases makes it impossible for the
Court and its members to serve the original purpose of being travel•
ing trial judges as well as final arbiters of any great portion of the
country's disputes. By Taft's time, the travel portion of the job had
become nominal, and the courts of appeal had been created to ease
the appellate load; but the burden of the remaining factors was
still impossible.
Taft conceived and pushed through the 1925 Act; Mason has
caught the genuine excitement of that story. The preceding sentence
may seem absurd-a bad illustration of the legal mind at work.
Admittedly, finding excitement in a law concerning jurisdiction is
a specialist's kick, like a botanist with a new leaf. However, the
importance of the 1925 Act can hardly be overemphasized. The
Court in recent years has often been, in many areas, the most consequential branch of the United States Government. Without the
Certiorari Act of 1925, this could not be so; the Court would be so
far behind on its docket that it would make the Southern District
of New York look current, so buried in an avalanche of minutia
that blasting power would not uncover it. The 1925 Act is the
absolute essential of the Court's modem role; it permits the Court
to be the most current court in the country. Nothing would please
Taft, a passionate current-docket man, more.
The Act of 1925 solved the Supreme Court's problem, but there
remained the problem of congestion and disorganization in the lower
courts. When Taft came to the Court, the individual district judges
were local satraps, controlled only rarely by anyone. Given life
tenure, negligible supervision, and even less help, they floundered
with the problems of their districts as though they ruled over unrelated principalities. This Taft thought all wrong. He conceived
of the federal legal system as a unit headed by the Supreme Court.
He wanted adequate statistical studies to show how well the in•
dividual judges were doing their jobs, methods of moving judges
from underworked to overworked districts, and leadership for the
system. To achieve that leadership, Taft conceived and carried
through the creation of the Judicial Conference as a working division
8. See p. 115.
·9. 43 Stat. 936, 942 (1925) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C,).
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of the court system. As he saw it, the judges themselves could become a control committee, exercising the leadership so clearly needed.
Taft began more than he could finish and left a heritage of work
still to be carried on. It took the Chief Justiceship of Hughes to
bring into existence the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, as
noted, not until Mr. Chief Justice Warren has the admiralty consolidation finally been achieved. The Judicial Conference of Taft's
day was open to the charge then made that it would become only a
gentlemen's dining association; not until Warren picked it up, revised its membership, and put it hard to work has the Conference
been able to realize much that Taft hoped for it.
·
Some of Taft's ideas have not been tried at all, and deserve to
be revived. First, a plan which originated with Taft's archenemy,
Senator Tom Walsh, but which Taft later advocated, was the transfer of petty federal criminal cases to the Court Commissioners.10 In
the federal district courts (other than in the District of Columbia)
there were about 33,000 defendants in 1964, of whom 29,000 were
convicted. Of this number, over 11,000 were put on probation, and
4,000 had sentences shorter than 366 days. Many offenses must have
been extremely minor; for example, there were over sixty traffic
cases.11 Taft's suggested plan might well give some relief to the
criminal dockets.
Second, Taft believed that the best method for cutting congestion would be a task force of district judges subject to roving assignment directly by the Chief Justice to districts needing their services.
Taft's request for eighteen such judges brought opposition he
could not budge. His opponents saw in it a chance for him to make
himself dictator, sending his minions to work his will in every
corner of the country. Anti-prohibitionists saw in it the prospect of
a parade of "hanging" judges snooping around the country's liquor
cabinets. The alternative solutions adopted were to permit transfers
only within circuits by the senior judge, or between circuits, subject
to cumbersome requests, and to add more permanent judges to congested districts.12
The compromises are not good enough to get the job done, and
second thought forty years later makes Taft look all the wiser. The
transfer system is at best patchwork, although the special task force
sent to the Eastern District of New York made real headway with
the backlog there. The mere increase of judges is now lamentably
a demonstrable failure. The recent prodigious increase of judges
under the 1961 Act, with appointments duly recommended by then
10. P. 125. For a discussion led by Senator Walsh, see 62 CONG. REc. 4845 (1922).
11. See 1964 ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS .ANN. REP. Tables D4, D5 (1965).
12. Taft had trouble enough on this more modest proposal, both from "wets" and
others. See his excellent Address to the American Bar Assc,ciation, Sept. 10, 1922, in 8
A.B.A.J. 601 (1922).
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Deputy Attorney General Byron White and concurred in by Bernard
Segal for the American Bar, were almost always of high quality, yet
the increase in case output is nothing like that which was anticipated.13 More judges require more administration among themselves,
more talk, more rules; also, Parkinson's law of work expanding to
fill the time available for those who do it has some application to
judges.
The Taft task force is probably even more impossible politically
today than in the 1920's. If the "wets" were concerned with letting
Taft assign judges, one can imagine the complaints of the "Impeach
Earl Warren" fringe at the prospect of having Warren make direct
assignments.14 These objections are foolishness. Taft did not suggest
that the Chief Justice should appoint or confirm the judges, although
the thought may have crossed his mind. The suggestion was only
that the central authority should be able to use the judges chosen
for this purpose by others, sending them where they are needed
and then moving them on. Every other plan has been tried and has
failed; this one is still worth trying.
III.

THE BooK

This book is doubly needed. First, Taft, as the only man to be
both President and Justice, needs at least two biographies. The work
on his early career and his presidency is well enough done. 16 Indeed,
so far as the general histories are concerned, the host of works on
Roosevelt and the Progressive Era, on Wilson, and on the first two
decades of the twentieth century are fairly adequate on Taft as
well. However, there was nothing even remotely adequate on Taft
as Chief Justice. Second, all too little has been ·written on the Supreme Court of the l920's from the conservative Justices' point of
view, and too little which approaches these Justices in terms of their
goals and their achievements. This sector Mason has by now made
his own by student spin-off. Paschal's excellent book on Sutherland16
is a work of one of Mason's students, and Danelski's recent book on
Butler's appointment, 11 although it does not direi;tly touch Butler's
judicial career, is also Mason-inspired.
Except for the biography of Sutherland, there has been no direct
discussion of the old Taft crew. Van Devanter is lost to posterity as·
13. For a gloomy report, see 1964 .ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. Ill, 115
(1965).
14. The opposition boils down to the observation of Senator Broussard in 1922
that it would lead to having "men tried by judges who possibly are not altogether in
sympathy with the ideas of the persons over whom they are presiding." 62 CoNG. RE<:.
4847 (1922). The general debate at this point gives a cross-current on the idea.
15. While there are other books, the two-volume work, PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT (1939), seems the best.
16. PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE,SUTHERLANI>, A MAN AGAINST THE STATE (1951),
17. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE Is APPOINTED (1964).
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a consistently negative-voting, non-writing Justice inevitably must
be; Taft could get few opinions out of this Justice, and Hughes
almost none.18 Butler, an immensely able developer of the thought
of the period, has attracted no biographer, Sanford enjoys warranted
obscurity, and no biographer has had either the interest or the
stomach to put up with McReynolds. The field has been abandoned
to the heroes of the liberals and the intellectuals-Holmes, Brap.deis,
and Stone. This is ·wrong even from the standpoint of devotees of
this holy trinity; just as Job needed his tempters so that he might
shine brighter by comparison, the great trio need their adversaries
to reflect their better judgment. Taft is the conservative counterpart of the labors of Brandeis, and Mason's book was imperative if
the history of the Court in the 1920's is to be seen in its entirety.
William Howard Taft, Chief Justice is a grand piece of work.
The material, much of it from Taft correspondence, is predominantly new to the public. John H. Clarke's letter on his resignation,
written to Wilson, is perhaps the most illuminating document in
the book and is new, at least to me. Mason's emphasis is wise; in an
excellent chapter he outlines Taft's intellectual outlook, and in a
later discussion concisely relates the development of that philosophy
into constitutional law. A choice had to be made as to whether to
give primary, secondary, or equal emphasis to Taft the administrator
and procedural reformer; Mason, wisely perceiving that this is the
part of Taft which has lived, gives his primary attention to the lasting work in procedure and administration.
Taft and his team are remote enough now to permit objectivity,
and Mason accomplishes this by presen.ting Taft with sympathy,
understanding, respect, and restraint. The richness of original materials is so great that Mason need not comment, though he does reach
conclusions; it is usually possible to let the Chief speak for himself.
This he does, energetically and, alas, in later years both querulously
and, sometimes, meanly. The Taft who emerges was changeable in
personal judgments, excitable, diligent and, . within the limits of
fairly narrow prejudices, open-minded.
The book is a remarkable achievement for Professor Mason, who
stands forth as the country's foremost judicial biographer. His
biographies of Brandeis19 and Stone2° reach broader plateaus than
does this volume, because here he restricts himself predominantly
to Taft's years as Chief Justice. In the other works he covered
whole lives, and lives of men more able and more significant in the
growth of the law than Taft. Nonetheless, this intriguing and thor18. The best available material on Justice Van Devanter is the Memorial, March 16,
1942, reported at 316 U.S. v (1942).
'
19. MASON, BRANDEIS-A FREE MAN's LIFE (1946); MAsoN, THE BRANDEIS WAY (1938);
MAsoN, BRANDEIS-LAWYER. AND JUDGE IN THE MODERN STA'IE (1933).
20. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE-PILLAll OF .THE LAW (1956).
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oughly workmanlike job makes Mason the only major biographer
of three Justices in American history. This could have been done
only by prodigious effort and skill and puts every lawyer, historian,
and political scientist deeply into his debt.

John P. Frank,
Member of the Arizona Bar

